Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b69feabcb099d14e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

68.4 KB
MD5: ddc8748f627e7727a9518b19cb6f64c6 SHA-1: baf82ff71736dad9f385c989d28c085d46c998ea SHA-256: b69feabcb099d14e0b621a0b75c804920ad585096cd7263536804eac89cb5e7e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The objupdate directive further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to arbitrary code execution. The file is classified as malicious, and the primary attack vector is likely spearphishing.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000089.bin
a4238efeaa2b987f52908a6e53f0068cca056a4803449518bfb05afc160f5e8f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x89 19413 bytes