Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b69f64b7869151ef…

MALICIOUS

RTF

126.5 KB Created: 2019-01-20 14:19:00 First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: 728e38839c82c912ae69489e82fb74f7 SHA-1: 70fc2030a7eccc2935cbb3157b4a2cefc7b24ea5 SHA-256: b69f64b7869151efbe69a06e31c18c0a4c04697de58aa92c2c67c3831689867e
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics for Equation Editor and CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation of a client execution vulnerability. The presence of shellcode API strings within an extracted artifact suggests the embedded object is a payload designed to download and execute further malicious content. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000116d9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x116D9 8592 bytes
SHA-256: 67ff0449c56810ed91342d38f4bcc93b13e25946a55d6fed92fc2708e3e82c64
objdata_01_off00015aa9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15AA9 6841 bytes
SHA-256: 4ae82c1a309daeb1f275c17cac194a77ad74999b4c0ff1a8f16ca57c4f14dcfb
objdata_02_off000193c9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x193C9 12923 bytes
SHA-256: a23441565a056b2e4b0a2176be7e3a8f8fb46657213c57020d648924b727abc7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY, SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD, SC_PEB_ACCESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryW, GetProcAddress, URLDownloadToFileW, ExitProcess