Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b69d2c3c4cff16df…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

738.8 KB Created: 2020-09-30 18:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2020-10-09
MD5: 9b0d70f2f248c7925adfc2cb54e15154 SHA-1: b4381ac291db420158e68b00fa1fb98d90cd9d26 SHA-256: b69d2c3c4cff16df809c883e0c20a273122b0b08557ceb906ab815fe3988db2d
82 Risk Score

Heuristics 3

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 1504256 bytes
SHA-256: e16ad4fe395944ee93baa3719aba97b4b0a6965636842c950aebf211117332b4
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 1489867 bytes
SHA-256: e48a457d1906e919adbeef66bf584f465c726ff58e2f12498765a92a4d48b507
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00_Unlock.exe ole-package-payload OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native payload: display_name=Unlock.exe; full_path=C:\Users\IAMBLE~1\AppData\Local\Temp\Unlock.exe; temp_path=; def_file= 1489408 bytes
SHA-256: a806b9a5387526ba45f48d5ad555109a3c98e13a10efd3b4721bfa7ed8e42953
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5156 bytes
SHA-256: a52f0e9f9a294026bd09a5f398c140966bb25890464cf08a367a9ebd0fa4f7e1

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