Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b695cefad36b65f1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

226.8 KB Created: 2002-05-09 09:19:47 -03:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 5.0 for PowerPoint (via Acrobat Distiller 5.0 (Windows))
MD5: 842aa849a55de5d6c10ab42b5c3b0180 SHA-1: 33558633160089c850c25b89d93b8255704da1c4 SHA-256: b695cefad36b65f15a66d1f0dc53e11d9094a81ecf3c20ccb2fc1f20961d897a
424 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing indicating a launch action targeting cmd.exe, which is further supported by the CVE_2010_1240 detection. Additionally, a critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD firing reveals an embedded Windows executable disguised as a PDF file named 'JavaJframe.pdf'. The PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS heuristic indicates that JavaScript is used to export this embedded data object, likely to execute the payload.

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\JavaJframe.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
JavaJframe.pdf
631bcd439431db002322355b4a7682327fd009660739c7d821f3fdb8ecc06c88		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 325 at offset 0x30302 102582 bytes
javascript_obj0326_000.js
39ff2fa098b6fb19d898fdeac9a3e26a6714dac54d6c1446734a669e1d288ddb		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 326 at offset 0x38469 59 bytes
icc_00_off00009009.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x9009 3144 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00000f8b.bin
a929b9390f9d717a16c5b8573b507ec4a511b1939d15fbf924fa51242b19fdbb		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF8B 51164 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fec2.bin
bf32a988725e980da5788c5b951a24dbc97be1256b901693801cabcc9bb793d1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFEC2 28256 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000142f7.bin
ff1adfd76196823f5b3a1461e3763d7c7d221cfe73a0b3a175280477837e2b3c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x142F7 36892 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off000197e2.bin
eac4cfc729f3585de619544d2cd2ea6e2a6470f8f0b2665dbef62b6c0b49ef16		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x197E2 36016 bytes
font_04_sfnt_off0001e7eb.bin
0be05329152339ecb2305596a49c5386423b8eb942619ae5343fefd6fdef9b06		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1E7EB 41572 bytes

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