Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b69512382fd901ad…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.2 KB Created: 2021-06-26 15:08:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 46efbfdba5951723166b64e0df2f75dc SHA-1: 8d367340ab8303efef1d41698d2168a6802c3738 SHA-256: b69512382fd901adce59a61356b89d39f75769bbca02eee1bd1479274039fb22
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF file containing embedded JavaScript, which is a common technique for exploiting vulnerabilities or delivering malicious content. Several heuristics indicate the PDF contains links to compromised CMS upload storage and disposable hosting, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution scheme. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely involving the execution of embedded JavaScript to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9952

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ukdirectremovals.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/287e6099b22e5778cbec635dcc0d9e91/tidafadatanaken.pdf
    • https://samowar.ch/upload/file/kivafalazolodivofigiwu.pdf
    • https://sk-developers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160afdfe51fde4---mamovasanenuv.pdf
    • http://studiotecniconuti.it/userfiles/files/fusibegufokixujadivab.pdf
    • http://anupbolivia.com/images/files/81719804639.pdf
    • http://wsp.pl/userfiles/file/kepazuwelotibasotidalik.pdf
    • https://gamasteel.net/userfiles/file/89956058048.pdf
    • http://dirabrealtors.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ba1aaa1f1f---lujubevelesasep.pdf
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c898ab257a---tiwuregojiki.pdf
    • http://xn--90ad5ackt1d.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/88a34412a34f0c2c644798f2d0623caf/60665250676.pdf
    • https://profbuhotchet.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1c3c5c5996a3d158dd3a43b0c21a0227/85688042172.pdf
    • http://www.olympussverige.se/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/sol1nool2f75ao89gfvt486009/vepesoteteni.pdf
    • http://triumphtoday.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cc1fee54eaa---pisudawexowavurimuroda.pdf
    • http://classiccar-jp.com/js/upload/files/74888354270.pdf
    • http://kirks-pool.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160850416c6ed3---rafamaref.pdf
    • http://perfectthesale.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d64b9e4e99---deboduweronefixag.pdf
    • https://www.travelticket.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2n131cmmod2sov1r1u8u6qfrcq/8151129334.pdf
    • https://www.gml.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aff8f26ac72---boluvibovogemev.pdf
    • https://upchealth.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4cd0f06a36a02f2074a3b85ecb3df932/visikijekim.pdf
    • http://www.elsecretodelolivo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf2e440b039---zexolurin.pdf
    • https://visaonline-vn.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pe8pu1cp11q60en8jiaj7spit8/47928529768.pdf
    • https://neavocats.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c7f220fa5b3d46fa6061bf2d2ef6a7d7/8568027972.pdf
    • https://noukos.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160942280dfc6b---36145497425.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=thank+you+for+sharing+your+details
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee2f.bin
fde6f284088013dafbdc52deee40a79d6ee5cc68c4fba959298c2b0c27c08915
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE2F 18132 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011c85.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11C85 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001349c.bin
d2e8857984f3babc5eb0b0bf06f2e11ccb3f98193bc4c923d13f769362701555
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1349C 10900 bytes