Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b6950e6d58d4a63f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.9 KB Created: 2021-06-21 11:26:31 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 0f6ab827f4459a7960e433e70e92ac7b SHA-1: 39daa2e3e977ef1401af0bc1d6aa269fcf2fc998 SHA-256: b6950e6d58d4a63f4a8722f1b881247ec73c836a38f05bc6b2bfb788a4308472
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including a fake CAPTCHA lure and a password-protected archive lure, suggesting it's designed to deceive users into executing further malicious actions. The presence of numerous links to compromised CMS upload storage and disposable hosting, coupled with ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan', strongly indicates a phishing or malware distribution scheme. While no scripts were directly extracted, the document's structure and heuristic firings point towards a multi-stage attack involving malicious links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Fake CAPTCHA / human verification prompt high SE_FAKE_CAPTCHA
    Document displays a fake CAPTCHA or human-verification prompt — used to trick users into running commands or pressing keyboard shortcuts
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.lifestaralberta.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a0bfd7c4901---62664036226.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://sg-design.top/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e11be16d548b4e9cecf59cb6851ea510/lugisalesivotutemesuxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://markasib.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/25462916136.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://longhoang.vn/upload/files/bimej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asesoriagarpe.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16091d4ddb400f---19545316965.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eminencesolutions.in/resources/userfiles/file/wisedufakadefovotarapifa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sandzthabapanel.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c2133287f0e---xowumugofi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eandjfamilyhealthcenter.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/35214887f6bb69ed10e2651b331acfa7/dexikutafezagukusizeve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kelvista.lt/images/files/14174447975.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.verpoort-bouw.be/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a928a101523---letuxopekotajazese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alarcon-v.com/editor_upload_image/file/belitozadigol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mattweidnerlaw.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d58a36e3f0---luzokuja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://drmiamiconnect.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ba186abae37cdf619be55fe78c4dcb11/15392960991.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://extreamtuning.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160875a6931505---xupawuzima.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://master-sign.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/60381091127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ausafrica.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609fbc183fb80---vavefixejege.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=bypass+frp+1+0+apkPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dff0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDFF0 4600 bytes
SHA-256: 2c555e5b73005fd405a6b68b6ceb9b900da91a85ed1c0b3a44480f9e49800ec5
font_01_sfnt_off0000ef96.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF96 10904 bytes
SHA-256: cbb55fdf202453ee203a4ea10b2572c702ec741ce2089666770356d65620d0b9
font_02_sfnt_off000114d2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x114D2 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2

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