Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b68dd5b95d999bbb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.21 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-30
MD5: b617a312bf6377f84c5bb996602ad326 SHA-1: e73a2817b786dd73873232e1c5d87d48053b04bd SHA-256: b68dd5b95d999bbbe68fe4a254a5cfa07c56facddc3641a366ad24488a6a7801
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel file containing a malicious Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. The VBA macro source is empty of executable statements, but the embedded OLE object itself contains the exploit payload. This indicates the primary attack vector is the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability to achieve code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
f81b5dc0f134bff67b32850863689811e3ff1dad6ed5cd918403c20cc4d6ab1e		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00749A94/Ole10Native 30803 bytes
ole10native_02.bin
0d8babf0cacab90584fa51e2765647de1d8ea85a69d541d358ad83cda58d9fac		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00749A9B/OlE10NaTive 2029 bytes

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