Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b672bb17dae63bdd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

110.9 KB Created: 2021-07-14 10:32:36 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: ad0941a19a69e88d3924b4c55ad29228 SHA-1: d6a4a385852554ba4222b9c05356b65cd0730129 SHA-256: b672bb17dae63bddba6425c80812ccc08f2670f74ad7a2e8d503307af4e4c4af
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link T1204.001 Malicious Link

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and a machine learning classifier. Heuristics indicate it is a payment redirection lure and a brand-impersonation credential phishing attempt, specifically impersonating UPS. The document likely contains links designed to trick users into revealing sensitive information or initiating fraudulent transactions.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9946

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=sap+database+administration+with+oracle+pdf.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.marbelitesa.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16079eba65ded3---5695261117.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://bamfieldrental.com/userfiles/file/19450182521.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://biirbeh.mn/images/content/file/nomujelitotulumagijumojo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.nuricomuvakfi.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/14r3gdt3c3de4ntpb9jc3c89v5/xorokasitoxit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.findvoters.com/userfiles/file/81765690323.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://marbellamohali.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e6315635e10dd757050cb6f234d51241/24125594369.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://directprocessors.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160917b446d1b4---65447751811.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ltgtrends.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/363039588417c4b431aa43b677b13a07/66015315019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.primalegal.eu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7hjut3ectclnepth69nk10lh40/mixurifadekijo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://utilitydiscount.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071442c17b40---wizokavotaworebedok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://twfbs.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/49003248899.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://busankid.com/webfiles/board/file///24206352672.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://efnnma.org/files/file/50479072765.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://anmimar.com/royal/userfiles/file/riketejojowemozexaforidox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dalton-english.com/userfiles/file/fasovoxefu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sxhk365.com/uploads/file///51113925139.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ippon.lv/uploads/File/wajedagaxavetedezasi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.charityweiss.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b770206cb22---62637690003.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://polish-house.com/uploades/fckeditorfile/pivir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.jcca.co.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075cdb329e49---92370349629.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thedewakohchang.com/image/upload/File/7122071553.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stewsites.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/35a35bce85e4f484799e0505710b3424/gamigegoxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.inkfactory.pk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bffdbc1efe2---95618817548.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.tocbirsen.org.tr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/20482868875.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://land89.com/ckupload/files/detagilajow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=sap+database+administration+with+oracle+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00014f6d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14F6D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0001677f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1677F 17368 bytes
SHA-256: 117b79860e8d5947be05d14428e148dc55e964eb5b1113d6ee41658a1af45f7b
font_02_sfnt_off0001941a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1941A 11188 bytes
SHA-256: 281d535dd081cf3468164df134326afada00cd9d88f6e9698ca29dc1b5fa7663

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