Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b64a9496d9117978…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.1 KB Created: 2021-02-05 18:01:54 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: 6aa18858b3c59be655204b2844854982 SHA-1: d9eb7e6ee57eb597adb298e6fc4203d0d6244564 SHA-256: b64a9496d91179789b55d9d57929465f12ddb466cc5b0718c3683a500c92a9b1
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or phishing lure. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malware. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URIs are indicative of techniques used to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://maypoin.ru/123?utm_term=nccu+edu+tw PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jejefudebuxi/jajaVjK/baboli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://luvodufugatese.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134893210/nanivejefi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://felelitujafi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135392562/9307750.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jarivilil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012847/4a6fa7177.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pixasarajesuwov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134688766/4414147.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xijodepub/25uK7KK/tadafetuxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://malalij.iblogger.org/financial_excel_spreadsheet_statement.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dodemawaj.iblogger.org/creditors_aging_report.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ninefajesazaga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135384029/8187791.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mimevomakiket.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134693464/485537.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gujuvizaja/ohgKijt/president_2020_polls_fox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mokevesin/hhihhju/27650370905.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://janalusexisowa.epizy.com/flyers_template_photoshop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nufitexevav.rf.gd/41868808299.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://derekage.epizy.com/14768879093.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://limixumijegaf.epizy.com/59314733585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kagedatabujo/47553254851.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001096b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1096B 15064 bytes
SHA-256: 6732ea3f175ae90db970aab6fc727324b5d18923eeaf2beb6776052d775c5a8a
font_01_sfnt_off00013970.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13970 4476 bytes
SHA-256: 449ddf5b790ea4b507e52cfbe0c089b1aad36ba3f6f8e7a3c6c9d9c96f06de99
font_02_sfnt_off000148d7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x148D7 11940 bytes
SHA-256: ffdd0438289019a33e6b8129fff1198d18ea21afba04080c05c207645603474d