Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b63e4b89c7f5c5f0…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.4 KB
MD5: c745aa5e165c71ac6368dc00de91899c SHA-1: d22b9079313dafb7824d92f6bef69c3db6441a6d SHA-256: b63e4b89c7f5c5f0137072a95f603c212e8a05de59dd8d6ffeb16ec7728959a4
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability for code execution. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA further supports the embedding of malicious objects. No scripts were extracted, but the heuristics strongly suggest exploitation of the Equation Editor.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d8.bin
5fd7093e630c69001e09624200fdf21252796e3ab14f6b5f4b654d78bc02c887
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD8 1431 bytes