Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b63d1f1258cda9f2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.7 KB Created: 2020-12-07 12:49:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 9a6ef320e05672ff05e80bbb947c0ad1 SHA-1: ba00efbfb14929bda9bf87c066f362b7d3a8c80d SHA-256: b63d1f1258cda9f2fa52d4b603c1a3795615a663d8ffd105b7074bf5d718b0e3
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, including links to known malicious redirectors and a large number of external PDF links, suggesting SEO link farming. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature. The document impersonates a signing service, likely to trick users into clicking the embedded malicious URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Document signing service impersonation lure medium SE_DOCUSIGN_LURE
    Document impersonates DocuSign, Adobe Sign, or a similar signing service in a signing-request context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?utm_term=technical+documentation+software+format In PDF document text
    • https://wufikasokuwomoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134359410/xofikiwegawemaj_sovugina_jozenerim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4372753/normal_5fcb0bdeacad5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4368956/normal_5fc68b17c954d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wozibasibif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134868806/zenawigexabugami.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4404738/normal_5fbf0fe141cab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387702/normal_5f985f3369820.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374373/normal_5fa2fb0a902f2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4453730/normal_5fb3d5d6cfecc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1bba9029-9a53-4a8c-9af1-c9a9cd6a4cf6/holcomb_mo_school_contact.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/52002bb6-b78d-4687-baf6-b8e7d63d6c45/36283372954.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ff956a62-2773-4459-9e32-3c78e68398b9/asce_32_01.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8bccc8eb-baed-453d-aa7d-88ae4673e4e1/teweneponusefututase.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/76b02e2b-6702-405d-9451-86a0166518ce/jotavarefofibefetonaso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e6fc5e3b-0d00-4b29-9493-2088b04ccda5/zebovoluge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/322b50e8-5e88-492e-92f3-85267432ae52/batasuwilopufevozitof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cd48.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCD48 5304 bytes
SHA-256: 02da3054db40bf4d61247e6f8fb883c294420f09f548042121f76f2793015cad
font_01_sfnt_off0000df36.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF36 10140 bytes
SHA-256: 10de59b2d7b97678ec966b6d6b0be7fb4c6bff7065f2fdf4df85f989b1c78160

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