Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b63410aee1ea13f6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

866.3 KB Created: 2022-09-26 12:15:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-09-26
MD5: 6cd073362222caa889f3489c86281319 SHA-1: 8ec1e49183949c2151a4f347a30eb7b9618a55de SHA-256: b63410aee1ea13f6175d41c6e980606cca09a12069f68e49b330d01f3e75a777
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA macro with an auto-execute function (Document_Open). The macro uses obfuscated calls to Shell() and CreateObject() to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10012499-0' further indicates its dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10012499-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10012499-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b6164f91c0df808710d742d9b2fe4b0a21356005428c571a0a622b5d62efbb19
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 31639 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
eba425406f10d12fa421bce0d29e6d63ca203254d22ee483bc768cf61d90cec1
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 34304 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10012499-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely