Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b629d20350cbf900…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.0 KB Created: 2020-10-16 09:47:06 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 6c48fe8dc3b2d0e148e7941e53a65f2a SHA-1: bd667d48f5a52246e8cbe2313345a0fea14adce7 SHA-256: b629d20350cbf900a11311bd2f2607831c8495581373bb550de06eeb838d9a2b
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=glow+worm+ultimate+3+installation+manual In PDF document text
    • https://genigudepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070712/kufaluduvubit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/vigirupiruwovilav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fijojonibiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681787/linurigaruxox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://meporolokiso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681401/bajibevivalasamojadu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pimupaxepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857198/bb81acb5b39.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369932/normal_5f88ebedecc61.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370074/normal_5f886789e2e60.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366004/normal_5f86ff8d618b6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365562/normal_5f872ebc89adc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366662/normal_5f88bba01afed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizekusoviwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453028/3895455.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rimesozarabef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607712/xananovetivagizaxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jivexine.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380908/pulozodug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3372bb3e-7a12-497c-9413-fe259cdd09bc/16081791356.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ba38d766-80b0-49ec-99f0-3ac996836ce0/zigakaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0486/0565/9304/files/percent_word_problems_6th_grade.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0504/2159/6334/files/zikodefaxipe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9580/2527/files/boston_market_nutrition_information.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6091/2537/files/35564662265.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004d44.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4D44 5000 bytes
SHA-256: c949a7ffb16b7a1459f1e006b834acbe57366d812b28ab479d82f4ead15b5bc4
font_01_sfnt_off00005e3a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E3A 8876 bytes
SHA-256: 2dd8cdc46235e8e747204c6eb16a20bef24001707cbdb13001b5f602744d1305
font_02_sfnt_off00007c33.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C33 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176

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