RTF malware analysis — malicious · b60b4f1785f00ec0

MALICIOUS

RTF

81.3 KB First seen: 2024-10-10

MD5: 0ec401b5d2c56cbfa14e473923300365 SHA-1: 4b44a08dd6980faab91e9e3ba37375a0db61a0b1 SHA-256: b60b4f1785f00ec084efc313789bc2585939e008e3aef8f25318ee0092dec01c

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the document is designed to automatically activate the embedded object upon opening, likely leading to the execution of a secondary payload. The specific exploit used is associated with the Equation Editor, a common vector for initial compromise.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001461.bin` `7c81da8b660375455ef389b6b940e261b83c66ea6a6654c0d3ab8768d62081ce`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1461	1664 bytes

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