RTF malware analysis — malicious · b5d48e4aa15901a8

MALICIOUS

RTF

94.4 KB First seen: 2024-07-31

MD5: fbc6766776e17ffa02a6813e4f20b22b SHA-1: 58110a9f8f62038bd95eea66c74523320f075176 SHA-256: b5d48e4aa15901a84ad2c00a6b6a228471c3e5ad695f7ea11e584afa43543a69

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, triggering heuristics for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE. This indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of OLE object data suggests the embedded object is designed to execute code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001eb2.bin` `ddf72b0eca9e37dd764210c7f433ab9a79b057999602b6e7ccf70eb154807feb`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1EB2	1947 bytes

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