Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b5cec8d039906fb7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

100.9 KB Created: 2006-01-25 08:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 6cbd292ca0b54aa14d92a54211606526 SHA-1: 8a8f6a6f7b7126f7feaa39895e86e0d31d96c4f5 SHA-256: b5cec8d039906fb7018f54642f85e00fcd94dd981fb83f95e0e00b043bc1b364
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The OLE document exhibits several high-severity heuristic firings indicative of evasion techniques, including PEB access, API hash resolution, and GetPC stub usage. The large slack space in the OLE structure also suggests potential obfuscation or packed code. While no specific document body content or scripts were extracted, these low-level indicators strongly suggest a malicious payload designed to evade static analysis and potentially download further stages.

Heuristics 7

  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX)
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • PEB API-hash resolver high SC_API_HASH_RESOLVER
    PEB access followed by ROR13-style API hashing, a common position-independent shellcode import resolver
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 103,294 bytes but its declared streams total only 21,151 bytes — 82,143 bytes (80%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API