RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · b5c695fc9fbb05ad

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

809.4 KB

MD5: 5ea82cadc375aa7b7da762fe0ec8c411 SHA-1: 6b23ae2347de4eaea3ffaf5c6bb32cbf4450acb1 SHA-256: b5c695fc9fbb05ad0bbdb22aacebd1148ef141a52c2fa5a51be10adeda6df96f

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as related to CVE-2017-11882, exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of ".objdata" and "\objupdate" sections further indicates that the embedded object is intended to be activated and executed. This points to a classic exploit delivery mechanism for arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000ab.bin` `f25d74087b91bb8e4f728253ea220bde4a373aba62c3f1a394f3d310d0820f93`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB	414221 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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