Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b593958d2e2a8d3c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.9 KB Created: 2021-04-23 10:49:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-25
MD5: 38f51a122b67df1ec3d428b29adcc372 SHA-1: 23506f61c72a5f3ee6a4a4cfd7f45296f18f70bb SHA-256: b593958d2e2a8d3ce2399fef6e405672eb359dd9f78bb8f71735d7dc1e32ec41
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of external links, indicating a link farm or phishing attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of numerous external URIs points towards a potential redirection to malicious sites, possibly for credential harvesting or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://fokemale.ru/strik?utm_term=can+a+pistol+kill+an+elephant PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gupimupiset/Cjigghf/42382833105.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gozawelesutu/hgibiid/pelavevug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388177/normal_602d4c19d1625.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/lojibuwe/aNOgiXR/heroes_war_counterattack_global_release.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4378155/normal_6022d24ec9b45.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pisupuwov/fiiIpjg/kimawulelaxetosozifalivo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/modonasuje/je0AWgi/kopulilowimemopapisak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wupifufexix/ggXichU/bofugepunogugubenajug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kidurukazag/gfmjahb/97337599580.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gisusisabez/XkgS7ZS/draw_climber_race.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412377/normal_6062bf3e41134.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://3d9856c9-ddaf-40ef-ab37-14107f3d3ee7.filesusr.com/ugd/938106_09f73fdd6b754f38a0d1fbb5817a30d2.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/09227390-bf51-4f6e-b371-6af3c6ea8a63/epson_xp-820_ink_pad_reset.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://88e92b2d-3ddf-41b2-a2ae-4af48bfba274.filesusr.com/ugd/b74686_32e5f07cd5324ce3a624f0d4aec0f49e.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://6c71f620-b6e5-46cc-9e58-526c5f0a7a41.filesusr.com/ugd/1c90dc_2eab4cdec55749c9a3906d28f8479ee2.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ec1f3230-65ae-41b6-8e81-3fe6ff224210/zebra_gk420d_printing_two_labels.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e852d1d9-c322-470d-a984-db3e3c83acab/how_to.learn_forex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5d4a7bf2-919f-4c58-882e-a3d0c419a85e/a_concise_public_speaking_handbook_4th_edition.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://1a447ccf-a6a5-490c-ad31-399ae8169532.filesusr.com/ugd/cf5184_7627b34eda9a4919833bba653409718a.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5ba11307-75e0-48c8-8c37-0a2437b31851/california_real_estate_final_walk_through_form.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7eaede73-b899-4ff2-bddb-dd2a6cd25c98/zobevadavomuve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f4b6501c-e96f-4947-bf60-5f2dfc079173/polaroid_sx_70_sonar_autofocus_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://9e1bd277-069e-4713-bdcc-1ab96cf790c3.filesusr.com/ugd/5fd2af_21a85f1472b64bd7b153adde70f26763.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fbe1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFBE1 2900 bytes
SHA-256: 10a07fc969e6c8cf41398fcfefa625e426b29a45b33f3716d0886db1405c0d2a
font_01_sfnt_off00010624.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10624 4780 bytes
SHA-256: 340339a9a95198cdedf8361a094870038297bb6391c3e8ee20017cef95df3632
font_02_sfnt_off0001165d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1165D 12724 bytes
SHA-256: 4cedd442725f4fad9657109f5915e00cd8adf2b96f3a7001624639c28ad7a160