Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b58dc110f1465ebf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.3 KB
MD5: 128941980408d3e522803bb8548dec9e SHA-1: b607aabae8b59ef73e32b23cdad6b99a7813e739 SHA-256: b58dc110f1465ebfd1cbd1c3a105132b53e34b5a76c1bf6667228224dedc8a26
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, specifically identified as a stager for CVE-2007-5659 using the 'collab.collectEmailInfo' method. This JavaScript is heavily obfuscated but decodes into a larger script responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The presence of this exploit and stager indicates a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 7

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D 273 bytes
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
13a440b620a2c3ab56ecd7a454209c60034ca8563aed2f487d8c2a929ce4d53f
deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A 5236 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
de1f51ea9b8280dc3c3b3aaf2d4bf058689607000de43ba1628daa08fec7433f
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 73251 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).