Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b57ebed8d8c286a7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

339.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-01
MD5: 8a57e71423ec2773f134ade6719332d7 SHA-1: 3b2eb2146252d4571ac2d56a58d4e2f25d35f863 SHA-256: b57ebed8d8c286a7168ae4f8187bc287e437adbd68a8ed9d385dc982f2da5444
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OLE object attempts to load a remote resource from the URL http://23.95.60.83/FBI/3/000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2333000000000000000000%230000000000000.DOC. This exploit is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of VBA macros, though not directly executable, further supports the malicious intent of the document.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://23.95.60.83/FBI/3/000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2333000000000000000000%230000000000000.DOC

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_003_off00007560.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x7560 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
67b61b8017c8861f5d99de002ebc02d2093773b78281367ff7b0eee0738e9b8e		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 344064 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00007a00.pdf
a293d90c87e5891cd0b010e17cfd4c4760a87282beee5e7d268b90b0b1ac1fba		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x7A00 316416 bytes

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