Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b578c9590b46e7eb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

9.9 KB Created: 2017-09-24 17:26:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2019-09-30
MD5: 9f0d07a58874dec6da26c5b1c81eddd3 SHA-1: 628cda32ce9405b4225a45f76c0bb4903c6f13f6 SHA-256: b578c9590b46e7ebca021a805b318b69908e7138379abe9d46fdf80ab2911b57
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious OOXML document that leverages an external OLE object relationship. This relationship points to a remote document hosted on a free TLD, specifically http://acantara.ml/emexco/PO.doc. This is indicative of an exploit attempt, likely targeting CVE-2017-8759, to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • OOXML external relationship targets a free/throwaway TLD high OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL_FREE_TLD
    Document has an external relationship whose target host is on a free, no-registration TLD (Freenom .ml/.ga/.cf/.gq/.tk). Legitimate business documents do not link out to a Freenom throwaway domain; these are a near-zero-FP phishing / BEC delivery tell (e.g. an RFQ/invoice lure pointing at 'shareddocuments.ml/RFQ'). The relationship may be a hyperlink, a remote template, or an external OLE object.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://acantara.ml/emexco/PO.doc OOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

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