Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b547df4a7266c7d0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.4 KB Created: 2021-06-01 17:58:15 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-07-13
MD5: d4dbaac4a1f4c0970c6814beb41658d2 SHA-1: a465ab57e54b551396c1d103405ddd88f0c5d386 SHA-256: b547df4a7266c7d093b2c781c9aaba827ffd9fc6bc3053798ed73c7baf61caf2
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or phishing operation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and the presence of external links suggest it's designed to redirect users to malicious sites, potentially for phishing or to download further payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/pbw?utm_term=walmart+pathways+graduation+test+answers+2017 PDF link annotation
    • https://rudozusaviso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134041113/risebusorijewake.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nopirepogoduk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134095858/sogitojilasu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tenimevu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315692/vexonakejokobatal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jivafizet.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134743279/tawawojepisim_marovedunixeka_zikamigi_letutaribufagek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mirotimazafisel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134352803/8729409.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://salogisamokowo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134649366/moxemu-sowogorusoxi-xubawilapibeze-tivefewetaza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dujomujur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134883281/rodivapinarenijikebe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bekawoxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134529307/rekafebadasevixe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jadibezunapav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134610372/kazufaka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zobatovegu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873738/bozakemifinafet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lakadepoti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135301691/tajizapofiratufup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kujepilam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135343620/7736922.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nawawuxilebop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134679594/6542675.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://visetululiv.pbworks.com/f/fijolasefozu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b90cca17-e7b6-4dc2-9fdb-eaedc1cb0548/91444028720.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pazimonofe.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144441099/37933788997.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nigezid.pbworks.com/f/60458739228.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://poxanoralanu.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144422268/nufevoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/73404fd0-b5d3-4152-abaf-98e9a38f0843/19794392843.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cf81.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCF81 5984 bytes
SHA-256: 2dea5548d72cfd88aa9bd94335029049e9220e181c28a12ff10fbd6694cdab2b
font_01_sfnt_off0000e3e3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE3E3 10700 bytes
SHA-256: 229cdf5da2b679c48242231845d3516ffbd7e8b0750e077326e485e8d2b3b4d9