Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b512413f3f2b6e89…

MALICIOUS

PDF

34.7 KB Created: 2020-10-15 08:29:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: ac4d29017bb79c11326212153343c41f SHA-1: 7a7d7955a929ebd3ae88f7b7a3d4c3b495d40f82 SHA-256: b512413f3f2b6e895b17cf82ec112e5b700ef392b11d319ecd726030720f2a48
174 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a lure impersonating a cloud document service, as indicated by the 'SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE' heuristic and the document body text. It embeds numerous links, with one identified as a malicious redirector pointing to 'https://gettraff.ru/123?keyword=microsoft+onedrive+apk+for+android'. This suggests the primary goal is to redirect the user to malicious infrastructure, likely for phishing or to download a secondary payload. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of embedded URLs and the impersonation lure strongly indicate a phishing or malware delivery attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/123?keyword=microsoft+onedrive+apk+for+android In PDF document text
    • https://mojivimimujovo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874437/sujikuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kekerisasil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775365/9591268.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043696.mozfiles.com/files/1043696/44014293600.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039874.mozfiles.com/files/1039874/descargar_olx_costa_rica_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0486/0536/4392/files/6840399136.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8556/8923/files/todd_parr_books_read_aloud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0495/5229/4055/files/gawisowesoxek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6dbdda8b-af52-4330-9e63-67efa2491826/vowamokibuborilotabuvu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/85733428-58d0-463f-83d8-a3add059a09f/1328287717.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/63daa64a-0a38-47fd-8fc4-2f1186084329/vezadaredusasap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cc5b10b4-59fd-4739-b885-4859e01dbf03/95203848544.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8515/9843/files/96802264748.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/9145/8725/files/vozelutewepifisipolu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0468/8150/5437/files/zadabijimiromo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0480/9441/2963/files/jonaranezewumovipivuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/5050/7690/files/fevikuwajilixepuwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004c2f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4C2F 5244 bytes
SHA-256: 64b9a652b46d774dd63733526588c8fe104e0cbd014c798d2393e97de9bab009
font_01_sfnt_off00005e1d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E1D 9260 bytes
SHA-256: 744a5d0a41e6b532d081b40068794b037aec4427614d46b694f0a679251621ea