Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b50d1173c40c7f0c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

128.4 KB Created: 2017-10-31 17:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 443e1156ddef9f6e8dae5c079a781bfb SHA-1: 747f8c0367c15556167d61362f8d65e71f09412b SHA-256: b50d1173c40c7f0cadffd3e47d19a56c0a4e4f6d4545c2ca3495f98b1a04b368
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an embedded OLE object, specifically an Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2026-21514. This object contains a payload URL, http://ebsitaly.it/KJhdshve3, which is likely used to download and execute a second-stage malicious artifact. ClamAV detections further confirm the malicious nature of the file and its extracted components.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ebsitaly.it/KJhdshve3 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4608 bytes
SHA-256: ea79ff1cde300f58e46e950d69277c0985ed4807efa785add5716cb81dae6f7c
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6364249-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2142 bytes
SHA-256: e9075f44fdf8473ce10eee9ee288ff84a5833be64709d272eebeac3152cdfa2e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin 3072 bytes
SHA-256: 9b121b27c7686d9b639806ec0862b5c37b87f4b75d1ed7f29353424e07dee5bd
ooxml_oleobject_02.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject3.bin 2560 bytes
SHA-256: eaecb0d871d91bc4d9c135c6d54cfa4f974df2201bf7dbeb903a8eb6f23de86c
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image4.emf 5148 bytes
SHA-256: 3cc31fbd40b7d35c35598b5ce3fa1744859316e5a0ac51a435e73bddffd5c51f
emf_01.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5372 bytes
SHA-256: 1c1ac3240eacc008438d7b57ae075594adefd5cee3fbda80f4ce7190cec6d74e

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