Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b5053b7462f26f91…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

55.8 KB Created: 2021-08-30 16:15:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 08014122a566db65c9cf2e8a94b4a95f SHA-1: 55d8fdfe7ac256cb73ad17c20405cfa49ddc5785 SHA-256: b5053b7462f26f919829ed5a786e7f015ac60c189a15d4c411f616d2aaf632a7
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor object. High-severity heuristics indicate the presence of CVE-2018-0798, a vulnerability associated with the Equation Editor. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability, likely leading to arbitrary code execution when opened. No document body text or scripts were extracted, but the presence of the vulnerable OLE object is sufficient evidence for this assessment.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style Equation Editor exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like, but it does not match the exact public matrix-overflow byte signature.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
b8f244c784a14fda8c6ae40dac1c44f6a59ef3e378be8278fbb76151c2480258		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 3584 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
2f17aad13e9a2bb28b71603bacc6cf0027c9641692e08641e3ad489b9fc44cc3		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10NATIve 1432 bytes

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