Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b4f200313ffedb2c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

575.8 KB
MD5: 225513828041aebf2506283efc3ba4ce SHA-1: 3e64c97d1ae87a63c9af286dad9a8a716dcd9db4 SHA-256: b4f200313ffedb2cf4a3e8dab1fababb3bf71f14512c2bbca77bb629002c4e9d
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, indicated by RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common tactic for macro-based malware delivery. The document body discusses financial audits and internal controls, likely a lure to trick users into enabling editing. The embedded OLE object is likely designed to execute a malicious payload upon activation.

Heuristics 4

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00006d10.bin
f163b5a8ad35164f6f5a7c20bb988bb44ab1427208c4dc5a256a47917698fe73
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x6D10 3751 bytes