Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b4e2392207825d3d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

48.0 KB Created: 2020-03-25 19:21:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: c2e8163b3715aa6ac383fe3a3ff3ab00 SHA-1: 0080595bfd06d4d5a75944976ea0f8693b925e36 SHA-256: b4e2392207825d3d4def8046d4488d0b1d4a8d2fd4afe5536a184fb0e9d859f5
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, indicated by the OOXML_VBA heuristic. The presence of a Document_Open macro and critical firings for Shell() and WScript.Shell usage strongly suggest that the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands. This is further supported by the EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE heuristic, which flags suspicious extracted artifacts like macros.bas. The likely intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload, a common technique for initial access.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
224c27c5dc99b628c94ba521a8993a3b94b65c08b5e2db8f1a1cc14b1518cff8		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3594 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
6cf5e2b6a12b506537c89e0ecc6c926d58989abaf1e06a4f5a0882919f3c680b		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17408 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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