Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b4c96aa603ebc8ba…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

815.8 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: a1ad1f003b9c9d6506490b316aa2c1ef SHA-1: b9a13f7d2ede3106b1b54290ec00071e6de41804 SHA-256: b4c96aa603ebc8babd3f3358e1dd8f8ea1ace8127bd08a18f2b12390a2268885
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This indicates the document is designed to exploit this known vulnerability upon opening, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force OLE activation. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploit-laden documents.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000c56fe.bin
a2b3c1c6dd9d2673a189dc3cecb29ea073d282bf72015cb48e66a9c46be72912		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC56FE 3739 bytes

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