Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b4c3aaa908e0f362…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.1 KB
MD5: 348fbbf96a270a1e4a320e6956e203f5 SHA-1: ae88d39a0f5f3f847f27ceca5978a9443d018cf7 SHA-256: b4c3aaa908e0f362e472841cf425144098a2e5db14658691dea82c5c3c62b3b7
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms and LibTIFF. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely as a first stage for a more complex attack. The presence of embedded script payloads within XFA forms further supports the malicious intent. No specific malware family could be identified, but the exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
42b4d20c16ab660c1dc00c1e11e3ed912c6088799195b0278f9ef5414319f691		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 81280 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.