Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b4bbbd3c1eec7173…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.5 KB
MD5: ba7b68208aa11957836d288858e3d00a SHA-1: 9020cf6b4399ac42920aa48d2a908e93a7f96a24 SHA-256: b4bbbd3c1eec71739a89667c8a74e2587a394cf1a11045a169927ebcc3dafef8
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. This indicates a likely attempt to execute arbitrary code via a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. No specific malware family could be identified, and no further IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009e.bin
5a4a1ac7211c033d332717fbaa5d6b22aacea570de4b4c9a0647fa06e96d0dd5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E 1579 bytes