Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b4b51b619e3e5621…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.7 KB
MD5: 5854ca79080c675397a197bbb7d278b2 SHA-1: 37f2434c04457b95bf66090f7b61bf81ae83e4b4 SHA-256: b4b51b619e3e5621a59682d54b6bff960acda1bc3bcf22d056d46e3f1fb28634
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious PDF

This PDF document exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader, leveraging XFA forms to execute a malicious payload. The embedded script within the XFA form is responsible for triggering this exploit. The primary attack vector is the exploitation of a known PDF vulnerability to gain initial code execution.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
92ce11e15ca4958c6171fc2bb3c4d2a3efd7296ca18035561e9081e04554d812		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 79881 bytes

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