Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b47474e0162e2ef0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

58.6 KB Created: 2020-10-27 23:39:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: 185d267097ad76489d965287c3ba799f SHA-1: d9e0b6454f765bec8d0a34bf65dbdcdc5957bba4 SHA-256: b47474e0162e2ef06f7112f42a1484f97720fabbd17482c5da10447dc8b1e0fb
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm and routes users through malicious redirector infrastructure. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/123?keyword=blackweb+bluetooth+headphones+wont+connect+to+iphone In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4401519/normal_5f926d80bd392.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369191/normal_5f91c607cfe10.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368228/normal_5f87639200206.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369928/normal_5f8d90c886620.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369310/normal_5f94d2802128d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366350/normal_5f871a1db1a21.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374199/normal_5f8c5db70ff1d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xijonezamo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407630/mimelivitopusowu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xonuveviriniw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738603/zegolanizu-bilefatesab-koxolez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://voxapinave.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740917/6f145.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zozunane.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316446/vubinumi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://naxesitigas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740165/a8ee73e8b856.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bededuxotulapil/jexogugadokosa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/leguvefu/dikuged.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pujinit/amener_emmener_apporter_emporter_exercices.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sedimeraxufi/greenberg_algebraic_topology.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/014897b3-ffd6-48c4-83bb-b56d35d09f62/jevexanixo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/53cf2395-a69a-4bf4-9025-edd439afb574/5258198422.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/088facd1-79e7-42a4-8147-d5639d16a15b/orden_de_trabajo_de_mantenimiento_pd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f4898566-f1af-41ef-9afd-da0d82bee0a8/22104518756.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9c3980bb-efdc-40e1-b0cb-4fac80270e11/mefuxuwajimokubisamezis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bc925c94-a6c1-495e-8a25-3e1a27da7c88/67219337567.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e11f3033-d990-40c2-8778-af44d0a4f8fa/56072726344.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bdc1407f-a03e-472d-ab68-0e7898c467b1/71999304153.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_006_off0000bb08.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xBB08 20272 bytes
SHA-256: c7a47fd247466915e5df6720f57c1b3f0088cc592287c7879bb7a3774cb473e2
font_00_sfnt_off0000787b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x787B 5412 bytes
SHA-256: 93e2888d16609c1bfa91e8b45f5b85ab52af8535af532d6d7bf2f27d2739ced2
font_01_sfnt_off00008ad8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8AD8 2520 bytes
SHA-256: 82237b993c6d98ffe35f9314e5448189fdeaea23488e23f16f9696cbb8ce5181
font_02_sfnt_off0000958b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x958B 11040 bytes
SHA-256: fd7e9fc623336ce13c6cef388eee51656446b513e630383bb6b1988deca30be3