Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b46d8660e6654a92…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.4 KB Created: 2021-02-22 20:40:30 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: baf9c19a1ec3350d0067b01948895f46 SHA-1: 8e770313266bddbe6747e2785f564a99cdc5e69f SHA-256: b46d8660e6654a925182cc16388a1e0cfbc366df8d6e4fa0bc7d8948b32e53c5
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a significant number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or phishing lure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm heuristic point towards an attempt to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/aws?utm_term=is+fresh+off+the+boat+on+netflix PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kekagate/hajcRgc/directv_now_login_att.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gubukaxonular.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135349028/1357643.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fuluzagile/eijG3gj/zomowamanit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fodigedij.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740281/9822090.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ruzawiwosaje.iblogger.org/speed_queen_washing_machine_knob_broken.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://manipiso.iblogger.org/42128265800.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zovitamojim/bgdicgi/vozidixazazo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vulovosovem/jbjezmC/7418692015.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/ruzemesafe/yiOjdwG/8275790205.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fezagigix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813643/wukegefikip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wemopizajazo/eqKZP64/lufolavigowodukinav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://jowuwivipi.rf.gd/38447748413.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fisiroxeriwew.rf.gd/esri_arcgis_10._6._1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fiwemigusa.rf.gd/anabolic_aftergrowth.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wipidomi.rf.gd/68862909485.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://puburibiv.rf.gd/lucian_guide_mobafire.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://roronusosewurul.epizy.com/subuxelunavuzigub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee24.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE24 5000 bytes
SHA-256: 63841cb07fc16159c53e0fe2479df78d01c88a0a623e4e5c3b13973d30cbae66
font_01_sfnt_off0000ff23.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFF23 11104 bytes
SHA-256: 28a2d2678714edfdd952e7d1b3a1ed9cf8a78fe7429174363260e7ab1da884e1

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