Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b4189067d0d8c87e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.7 KB Created: 2021-02-20 14:15:09 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 44628e7d89e6ee05371f85048d0f90b2 SHA-1: 24051641bcfa78cd2a6b5e92ab477d23de7b6e39 SHA-256: b4189067d0d8c87e0f9b694b9fb09d82501cf782a60d7a706281ba7e96bef556
206 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a heuristic firing for 'PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD', indicating malicious script execution. It also lures the user into executing commands via the clipboard, a technique often used to trick users into running downloaded malware. The presence of algorithmically generated URLs and link farms suggests a phishing or malware distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://druttle.ru/strik?utm_term=learn+windows+powershell+in+a+month+of+lunches+third+edition+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://bipagaposelugi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134479594/sulimi_zosaro_mosunutifigisuf_depuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sadovik.me/gavulukugujolxm353.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://privateguardingserviceagainstdanger.site/marvel_encyclopedia_2017_free_downloow7w3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bujovuve.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738596/aa0525.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bamitizelomodil.22web.org/best_in_ground_basketball_hoop_2018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://goossyy.online/ge_carescape_v100_operators_manualn2tqz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lefusavuforuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134490278/6898175.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lianhua.life/plot_diagram_worksheetrmiei.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://zodexalanokaxaj.rf.gd/vcenter_6_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fuwuwiri.rf.gd/mopojifituwowenuto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dipijiz.epizy.com/army_amino_apk_old_version.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xabasib.rf.gd/lowoparuzij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pomogaxelako.rf.gd/swot_analysis_template_word.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sarozaxag.epizy.com/81417416479.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://siparedobapu.rf.gd/kafalowobofazi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://somukagokololu.rf.gd/ceptam_9_syllabus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kapivuvarebe.rf.gd/gmat_sentence_correction_exercises_with_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00010d02.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x10D02 1719 bytes
SHA-256: 773ecd317819cc2a838fde5cc7ae01fa4cc78553c621022d1461e367b982f23f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Mobipocket Creator'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Mibabemi Kiwoxuje</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Learn windows powershell in a month of lunches third edition pdf. Page 2 You cannot do this at this time. You are logged in with a different tab or window. Reload to </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Learn windows powershell in a month of lunches third edition pdf. Page 2 You cannot do this at this time. You are logged in with a different tab or window. Reload to </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Learn windows powershell in a month of lunches third edition pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Mobipocket Creator'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-02-20T12:21:55'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Mobipocket Creator'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='1d276541-b82b-48b8-9a85-e149e0736d6e'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='a1ec2657-91c9-4abd-bcb5-3bfb6d5bdb71'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000cf9a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCF9A 5428 bytes
SHA-256: 71916a563eab8c49060f061eb04979d5e007ba15c2e1c1efe10623c211f5a666
font_01_sfnt_off0000e201.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE201 10244 bytes
SHA-256: 625ebd45f3d5544df33a70b9e3e9782ae11c0101e8af8772494964601c95a8fc