Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b4102279fc29dd67…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.8 KB Created: 2020-08-30 13:21:48 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f0958d08c71c0d6218532b7c3003101f SHA-1: 41861c48137b24320ffc17b51099e8bd50db84e7 SHA-256: b4102279fc29dd6728ca502cda5e9ceaf0e9f10bd1d37c4bd312786c0df8e763
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a lure related to payment redirection, specifically mentioning new or changed bank instructions, which is a common Business Email Compromise (BEC) tactic. It embeds multiple links, with one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be part of this redirection chain. The presence of a link farm suggests an attempt to obscure the final destination or to distribute the malicious content.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=ibercaja+directs+particuliers+tracki
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/d54300_97a2fe28e9cd4ce0b836021dec2c6887.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e9b01d07d95c4b9e85287a58ed98cc9e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9c43ec_87ca5cc291f24fa0aac09e4145d0df44.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8168/6439/files/hau_bsc_agriculture_online_form_2019.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f7fbc8_fe32dbda3d1141c08fb7cf44755c6059.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/cc14e4_4df9bfba478f461d9eda3a7a9f7e03c0.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b7ed05_ac38a4c42d324c669e0aa38bffe9a7a5.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/8b4172_dd9cdbcbb56747b985da0ebd7a173b4c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_a48fdee1769d4996ab14cc2f69dff205.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/95089d_b2002a4f570f4708972bf127f206fdb0.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005e1c.bin
7429be29bf7e1ff0a1f796c850210c832169f4639579b1526b9f0c0107a53703		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E1C 5284 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000701e.bin
04e68a052fd79c4166be35f02b413072b5fe08e68690c592365087fcb972f230		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x701E 10044 bytes

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