Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b3fa4e77ce361410…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.16 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-27
MD5: 44eb4af3e9c13af19757759c15223929 SHA-1: 467ebb57785f14f3b5e1568bd97cee53b7bc591b SHA-256: b3fa4e77ce3614106e3dbda35cd8078c8fd4a139706e3b02466154736f617b89
174 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL Moniker to download a secondary payload. The embedded URL http://192.3.243.146/hcls/2/FeeeeeeeeeeeeeeFeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23FeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeFeEEEEEEEEEE.dOC is highly suspicious and points to a remote loader. Additionally, a secondary embedded PDF was found with suspicious static findings, indicating a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 7

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.3.243.146/hcls/2/FeeeeeeeeeeeeeeFeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23FeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeFeEEEEEEEEEE.dOC
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001c00.pdf
bb2b24507634cee0986713c3fc07d42fc9cf58f2d2959480bd4fa105f33937d7		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1C00 1205248 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006e00.pdf
0d7f5a35b7fdebd8f7e730e8b8f6f504781ddd6d17887f71cf3d3a309dbd113b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6E00 1184256 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001c600.pdf
6c26f9d9ded8627f42ca7b749e7667e3640a9bdf7d47fe7706ad1bb23b0ade12		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1C600 1096192 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002c600.pdf
9c25ea6a170b4771ae2e5817ce65206d62610537436d015c0540925c81573775		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x2C600 1030656 bytes

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