Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b3cb09a5bbc607b5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

211.9 KB Created: 2021-02-08 18:50:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: de85592bbcd55ffc368062e1e983a508 SHA-1: 9b20ef9905e6ee05988a333d20f9ae28130abcb6 SHA-256: b3cb09a5bbc607b52cffc46f969d342e30ca8e69984bf54f3057a5298c2e124d
62 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a risky file type, specifically a JAR archive, which is often used to deliver malicious payloads. The embedded OLE object is the primary indicator of malicious intent, suggesting the document is a delivery mechanism for a secondary stage.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
4ef912bdc3acb7fe876fef4dc70cdffa3393fea72186201465e34c5029545335		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 202240 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
bcbaa2f8f3d85b7ebaba48542afedfa73ed1ef730f1ac9b5ca86b26bd2599ec9		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 197676 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
318eb67f36063aa67cd680ce4107b904972437775de093a8fd516600b4efe021		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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