Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b3caa7ce9a8de209…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

448.6 KB Created: 2022-04-27 06:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 33475086547941b54382d1a21fe978e3 SHA-1: a127998527ace4c042e5af160576f33709967186 SHA-256: b3caa7ce9a8de209d5a63ab95485c1181f7fca03346330fe92ff3c0a0a9c1040
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OOXML document that leverages CVE-2023-36884 to load an external RTF object. This external object is hosted at the URL https://paknavy.paknavy.live/5516/1/4367/2/0/0/0/m/files-db71f6b3/file.rtf. The exploitation of this CVE indicates an attempt to download and execute a secondary payload, likely for further system compromise.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2023-36884 — external RTF auto-load relationship critical CVE likely CVE_2023_36884
    Document auto-load relationship references a remote RTF file (https://paknavy.paknavy.live/5516/1/4367/2/0/0/0/m/files-db71f6b3/file.rtf), matching the stronger Storm-0978/RomCom external-RTF delivery shape. Plain clickable hyperlinks are not enough for this CVE rule.
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf
1833637d2bb49186e0667ae0896ecc4d5b00b3383529f74edb75cad8748cd9b3		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 52 bytes

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