Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b3b33d5e95ded2f4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.8 KB Created: 2021-06-24 06:48:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: df962071c0ee9e4dc0d9ecda2a1be9ee SHA-1: ccabb4af197d5b93fd14367f567f8e0f13912daf SHA-256: b3b33d5e95ded2f44b791b737095b747d2a84be46f2f3d2fba3bc09c104be6db
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to PDF files hosted on various platforms, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself is indicative of a malicious campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 5

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://rudagaje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310377/011a65ad656b9.pdf
    • https://jaxurevinul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134868463/zusemadikigeb.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4393022/normal_5fe88e9a024ab.pdf
    • https://puzapageduz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453954/sabasonugekiv-zetuka.pdf
    • https://lobalose.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136089755/4198450.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4499351/normal_602e51fdd3e1e.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4487897/normal_60601b52ea00f.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4495988/normal_6035deb0c9c99.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4470532/normal_60b7fe11d145c.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4487187/normal_60613f2a3043e.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4445115/normal_6027b2b3a658c.pdf
    • https://tazejoga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383942/vosolop-fewitoxuruzob.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/sq/ugae/~3/AG-UZpNbJGc/square?utm_term=zangwill+electrodynamics+solutions
    • http://xudusuvo.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/145159083/69758984347.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3d80b32c-52de-4314-aca8-063c830914ab/how_much_does_a_skyjack_3226_weight.pdf
    • http://kuperuxowix.pbworks.com/f/rabito.pdf
    • http://ridelox.pbworks.com/f/pawuzu.pdf
    • http://visetululiv.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144835392/wifi_password_hack_v5_apk_android_download.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0c1fb1d2-aff0-45f8-a9a7-d8b5a70ee127/difipopobes.pdf
    • http://tulezibat.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144858666/54309232789.pdf
    • http://lodedeti.pbworks.com/f/3155977753.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f6e62aac-12a3-4608-8f04-b743d4ed8487/segundo_grado_lecturas.pdf
    • http://mikabipi.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144437982/dazekot.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ffb8f2fb-7de0-4c87-8fad-ad7d963a1ace/73804143178.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e009.bin
045484375b5edf228fd659a412144b55addf4f8173f334c77887ef921c2b009b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE009 5292 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f1fe.bin
4809b2b9075d4bac528525bd05483503425a29ce3a523f1c71f0311586d444ad
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF1FE 10992 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011764.bin
9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11764 4324 bytes