RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · b38d0eb1dd5d25e9

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.7 KB

MD5: 6e0be79bf97923ea95de3d30af4bca13 SHA-1: a3ef62e0329c1c43572eda836e87ba00f66dba9c SHA-256: b38d0eb1dd5d25e98f079ef9848cbbf527726aa9dd76bd6334d3b7343aeb312b

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to activate embedded content. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable macros or editing to bypass security measures. This combination suggests the document's primary purpose is to exploit user interaction to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `5e24fe39f9fe3236eb04cf596c11571957d0f5694c03347ad760dac2474d1da2`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	19844 bytes
`objdata_01_off0000ab42.bin` `18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB42	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off0000c0e5.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xC0E5	12297 bytes

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