Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b3876e0651da141a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

811.8 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: f55d351c984f80158f14aff2bee3c65d SHA-1: 61d5c7ddb3bba7caa4299fb5f2fb7d859b503f12 SHA-256: b3876e0651da141a6151ca03d8580574d3962cbb8c80f8e40bcb4a6ba1995e55
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1204 User Execution

The sample is an RTF document that leverages CVE-2017-8759, a critical vulnerability in MSXML SAX OLE activation. This indicates the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to execute embedded OLE objects, likely for malicious purposes. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJEMB heuristics further supports the embedding of malicious content. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000c0ac1.bin
26759d3672e6fdccff3f36e1b19b05619c3142f8d70527c7b3195febb3acd270		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC0AC1 3739 bytes

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