Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b3838dc2b59b83d2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 41b0b32b825d84ded55b8376f0d8198e SHA-1: a17ea0b2bfeff9448bffbc59d634489235e92ed3 SHA-256: b3838dc2b59b83d2d15142b5d5225dec43ef4e61e8a31f074951785204fb2f13
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This is a common delivery mechanism for initial access.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009a.bin
6698772cc243bf354a1924cbf06dcd72d18ef1af453a8a636e36b6a8fd776b09		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9A 1889 bytes

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